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The Honduran incumbent president and his administration recently
declared victory in an election riddled with irregularities and indi-
cators of fraud, not least of which was a numerical anomaly: the
primary challenger carried a very significant lead of five percentage
points more than half way through the election but was ultimately de-
feated by the incumbent. The incumbent (Hernandez) offered a plau-
sible explanation for the highly improbable turnaround in the ballots:
his popularity is greater in remote areas of the country but votes
from remote areas were not counted until later in the election. Here,
we mathematically formalize this argument, which we will call the
Hernandez conjecture, and employ the resulting formulae together
with geodemographic data from Honduras to quantitatively assess
the conjecture’s veracity. We analyze fair-win probabilities assum-
ing that the election outcome was the result of: 1) geodemography-
independent preference (GIP) only, 2) geodemographics only, and
3) both. When the departamentos were analyzed individually, three
sparsely-populated departamentos (of 18 total) showed small but
non-negligible probability of the conjecture’s veracity under 2 and
3; however, when the country was analyzed as a whole, the overall
probability of the conjecture’s veracity was calculated to be less than
10≠4 under a wide range of different assumptions and model vari-
ants. Results of our three-pronged analysis, taken together, indicate
a negligible probability of a fair win by the incumbent.
Political geography | Electoral dynamics | Mathematical politics | Latin-
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In 2009, a constitutional crisis occurred in Honduras, sur-rounding alleged lifting of a constitutional ban on re-election,
that snowballed into a “transfer of power” and the placement
of presidential power in the hands of Congress [1, 2]. The
United Nations, the Organization of American States (OAS),
and various countries refused to acknowledge the de facto gov-
ernment as legitimate, despite the Honduran Supreme Court’s
claims that the coup was legal. The Supreme Court’s assess-
ment was subsequently backed by then US Secretary of State
Hillary Clinton’s reassuring characterization of these events
as little more than a political hiccup [3]. The political lineage
instated by this hiccup persists to this day, and the face of
that lineage at present is president Juan Orlando Hernandez
of the right-wing Partido Nacional (National Party) [4]. This
political lineage was a boon to multinationals and was seen
as an ally in the Obama-era initiatives to combat corruption
in the region, stimulate growth, and reduce the flow of immi-
grants to the US, especially children [3, 5–11]. The Central
American Alliance for Prosperity framework, called “Honduras
2020”, was one hopeful face of these initiatives [5, 12]. But
the increased presence of multinationals, and the facilitating
neoliberal policies behind it, did not translate into a boon
for all of the Honduran people [3, 13–16]. Indeed, while a
small minority of Hondurans did enjoy a significant boon in
personal wealth, the hard evidence indicates that the majority
of Honduran people were adversely a ected [17–23].
To facilitate the continuation of this political lineage, a
series of calculated moves orchestrated by Hernandez over the
course of several years set the legislative stage for nullifying
the clause in the Honduran constitution prohibiting re-election
prior to the 2017 election [1, 3, 17, 18]. The November 2017
election was the first race since the establishment of the con-
stitution during which a president could seek re-election. The
President of Honduras is elected by popular vote, whereby the
candidate receiving the most votes in a single round of voting
is declared the winner.
Hernandez’s principal challenger in the 2017 election was
Salvador Nasralla, who headed the center-left Alianza move-
ment (Opposition Alliance against the Dictatorship), a coali-
tion of previously established parties consisting of the Par-
tido Libertad y Refundación (LIBRE), Partido Anticorrup-
ción (PAC), and Partido Innovación y Unidad (PINU) parties
[24, 25]. As the votes came in on election day, the Supreme
Electoral Tribunal (TSE) – which consists primarily of Her-
nandez loyalists – curiously suspended vote counting for seven
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hours and withheld the customary announcement of running
totals [26]. During this interval, both of the major candidates
declared themselves the winner. When vote counting resumed,
the TSE eventually announced their first preliminary results:
with 57% of the votes counted, Nasralla carried a seemingly
insurmountable lead over Hernandez of five percentage points
[3, 27].
At this point, after 57% of the votes had been counted, the
TSE halted the vote counting for 36 hours [27, 28]. When the
vote counting resumed following this hiatus, Nasralla’s lead
slowly eroded [28]. When the TSE then took a second hiatus
of eight hours, Nasralla decried the election as fraudulent
and declared that he would not recognize its outcome [1, 27–
30]. Reasons for the interruptions in vote counts included an
alleged system failure which, among other things, required the
reformatting of computer hard-drives [29].
Hernandez’s government issued a 10-day curfew from 6
PM - 6 AM to try and curb protest violence and activity
[31–33]. By December 2nd, 7 people had died and 20 were left
injured in brutal repression of the protests, a trend that has
continued to the present [28, 34, 35]. On December 2nd, the
Honduran National Roundtable for Human Rights issued a
press release that labeled the government’s actions an act of
terrorism against its citizens [36].
Hernandez was ultimately declared the winner with 42.95%
of the vote to Nasralla’s 41.42% [4, 37]. Protests immediately
erupted in response to this news [38]. The OAS has o cially
reported that there have been several irregularities in man-
agement of the voting and voting tabulation [37, 39, 40]. In a
rare display of bold opposition to the US, secretary general of
the OAS Luis Almagro announced that the OAS was calling
for a re-election [37]. Hernandez rejected this position, and
accused the OAS of being partial to Nasralla.
The spectacular turnaround in the ballots following the
interruption in vote counting, while curious indeed, was never-
theless given an entirely plausible explanation by Hernandez
and his loyalists: the Partido Nacional enjoys more support
in rural areas of the country that are far from major voting
centers, and votes cast in these areas required more time to
be shipped into the major voting centers and were therefore
not counted until later in the election [4, 39, 41]. In what
follows, we will refer to this explanation as the Hernandez
conjecture. Such geographic e ects on voting trends are not
new [42–44], but some evidence would suggest that they are
increasing worldwide [45].
The Economist analyzed the vote tallies as reported by
the TSE and compared that information with census data to
analyze the validity of the Hernández conjecture [41]. However,
The Economist found that explanation implausible, noting that
the swing happened in municipalities, which tend to be small
and urban, across the country. The only other explanation
for the swing in the vote tally would be that paper ballots
favored Hernández by 18 percentage points where electronic
ballots favored Nasralla by 5 percentage points, but, as The
Economist noted, the "odds are that that didn’t happen” [41].
Georgetown University professor Irfan Nooruddin per-
formed ballot-data analyses for the Organization of American
States and found there to be a sharp swing in the vote-count
trend after 68 percent of the votes had been counted [39].
In addition, statistical analyses of the election performed by
Honduran engineer Luis Redondo found a qualitative shift in
the shape of the voting distributions at around the same time
point [46]. Both conclude that these di erences are too large
to be generated by chance [37, 39, 46, 47].
Here, we complement these previous analyses by carefully
scrutinizing the Hernandez conjecture. Our rationale is that
the Hernandez conjecture remains a plausible explanation
(perhaps the only remaining plausible explanation) for the
spectacular ballot turnaround, and its veracity has not formally
been assessed. In what follows, we mathematically formalize
this conjecture and use the resulting formulae to ask whether
the data support it.
Modeling the Hernandez conjecture
Definitions.
• We will employ the term “half-time” to denote the time
at which the vote counts were halted due to an alleged
system failure. This point in fact occurred a little more
than half way through the elections: the alleged system
failure occurred when 57% of the votes were counted.
• We use the word “geodemographics” in a narrow sense
referring only to the geographic distribution of the pop-
ulation (i.e., how population density is distributed over
the geographic map of Honduras).
• We define vH and vN to be the total numbers of votes
for Hernandez and Nasralla, respectively, that had been
counted by half time, and we define their sum: v =
vH + vN .
• We define VH and VN to be total numbers of votes for
Hernandez and Nasralla after all votes are counted at the
end of the election, respectively, and we define their sum:
V = VH + VN .
• We define independent variable x to be the distance be-
tween a voter and the nearest voting center.
• We let u(x)dx denote the number of voters whose distance
from the nearest voting center lies within the interval
(x, x+ dx).
• As defined previously, the Hernandez conjecture refers to
the argument employed by the incumbent to explain how
he won the election fairly despite a significant lead by
the opposition at half time. This scenario rests on two
fundamental premises:
1. The demographics premise, referring to the incum-
bent’s claim that, as the distance to the nearest
voting center increases, people are increasingly likely
to vote for the incumbent. This premise is imple-
mented in our model by function fH(x).
2. The vote-count dynamics premise, referring to the
incumbent’s claim that, as the distance to the near-
est voting center increases, the probability that a
person’s vote would have been counted by half time
decreases. This premise is implemented in our model
by function g(x).
Taken together, the foregoing two premises could, in prin-
ciple, give rise to the spectacular ballot turnaround ob-
served in the 2017 elections that culminated in a win
2 | www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.XXXXXXXXXX Gerrish et al.
by Hernandez. Generically, this Hernandez conjecture is
reflected by the simultaneous fulfillment of the conditions
vN > vH and VH > VN .
The model.Given the foregoing definitions, our model is de-
scribed in Fig 1 and gives rise immediately to vote counts at
half-time:
vi =
⁄ xM
0
fi(x)g(x)u(x)dx , [1]
where i œ {H,N}, H denoting Hernandez and N Nasralla;
and after all votes had been counted:
Vi =
⁄ xM
0
fi(x)u(x)dx [2]
Fig. 1. Schematic of our mathematical model of the Hernandez conjecture.
Independent variable x (horizontal axis) is the distance between a voter and the
nearest major voting center. Solid red curves plot probabilities of voting for Hernandez,
fH(x) (three different plausible curves); these probabilities are some increasing
function of x. Dashed red curves plot probabilities of voting for Nasralla, fN (x)
(three different plausible curves); these probabilities decrease in x. The blue curve
represents a plausible plot of voter-population size u(x) as a function of distance
from the nearest major voting center. The green line plots a plausible function g(x),
defined as the probability that a vote cast at distance x from the nearest voting center
would have been bussed in and counted by half time. In most of our analyses, we
make the assumption that g(xM ) = 0, where xM is the maximum distance between
a voter and the nearest voting center. This assumption facilitates the analysis, making
it non-parametric, and it also is a conservative assumption in the sense that it favors
the Hernandez conjecture.
Summary of results
Our three-pronged approach.To glean as much information
from the numbers as we can while relying on the fewest possible
assumptions, we take a three-pronged approach that begins
as agnostically as possible. Throughout our analyses, where
assumptions are necessary, we consistently opt for the most
conservative assumptions, i.e., assumptions that most strongly
favor the Hernandez conjecture. The three prongs of our
analyses and results therein are summarized here:
1. The “no-geodemographics” extreme. In this ex-
treme, we treat the vote counts as if they were coming
from a single, completely homogeneous, population; in
this population, the rate at which votes are counted is
the same throughout. Standard statistical approaches
are readily applied to such a population. Given ballot
data from the first half of the election, we compute the
probability of a fair win by Hernandez to be:⁄
P{VH > VN |VN}P{VN}dVN =
⁄
(1≠  Y )d Z [3]
where Y = (VN/V ≠ p)/

p(1≠ p)/v and Z = (VN/V ≠
q)/

q(1≠ q)/v, with p = vH/v, q = vN/v. As commonly
denoted,   is the cdf of the unit normal distribution.
Computed under this “no-geodemographics” assumption,
the probability of a fair win by Hernandez is e ectively
zero (¥ 10≠1770).
2. The “all-geodemographics” extreme. In this ex-
treme, we assume that a person’s tendency to vote for
one candidate or the other depends exclusively on where
that person lives: averaged over the entire terrain in ques-
tion (an average taken over space), the net preference
for one candidate over the other is zero. The outcome of
the election, in this extreme, is a product of one thing
only, namely, how the population is distributed through-
out the region under scrutiny. Assuming those farthest
from voting centers had zero probability of being counted
in the first half of the election (an assumption favor-
ing the Hernandez conjecture), and implementing linear
functions for the spatial dependencies, we find that the
relevant conditions reduce to compact expressions that
very conveniently have no parameters to be estimated.
The condition for a fair win by Hernandez in this extreme
is:
E(X ≠ 12xM ) > 0 , [4]
where random variable X is the distance between a voter
and the nearest voting center, and xM = max(X). The
condition for a half-time lead by Nasralla in this extreme
is:
E[(X ≠ 12xM )(X ≠ xM )] > 0 [5]
The condition for a turnaround in the ballots such as the
one observed in Honduras is thus a condition in which
Eq. (4) and Eq. (5) are met simultaneously. The simulta-
neous fulfillment of Eq. (4) and Eq. (5) thus constitutes a
mathematical formalization of the Hernandez conjecture
in the all-geodemographics extreme. We note that Eq. (4)
and Eq. (5) do not depend in any way on ballot data; they
depend only on the geodemographics of Honduras. These
developments readily provide a non-parametric means to
assess whether the geodemographics of Honduras alone
are su cient to: A) promote a win by Hernandez Eq. (4),
and/or B) support the Hernandez conjecture (Eq. (4)
and Eq. (5)). Using geodemographic data from Honduras
obtained from Wolfram databases [48], we tried several
di erent ways to distribute voting centers throughout the
departments and throughout the country; in addition, we
explored logarithmic and power-law spatial dependencies
in addition to linear; however, we were unable to find a
configuration for which the probability of the Hernandez
conjecture was not essentially zero (in many cases too
small to be computed by standard numerical integration
routines). When the di erent departamentos were treated
individually, we again found the Hernandez conjecture to
be essentially zero in all departamentos except for one,
namely, Gracias a Dios which had non-negligible upper-
bounds under some configurations (see Figs 6, 7, and
8).
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Fig. 2. Probability of the Hernandez conjecture by departamento, in the “all-
geodemographics” extreme. Colors indicate the probability of the conjecture, com-
puted as the fraction of bootstrapped data sets for which Eq. (4) and Eq. (5) are
met simultaneously. Here, we assumed one major voting center per departamento.
Probabilities are essentially zero (gray) in 17 departamentos but were non-negligible
in one departamento, namely Gracias a Dios. A look at Fig 5 shows these this
departamento to be among the more sparsely populated.
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Fig. 3. Probability of the Hernandez conjecture by departamento, in the “all-
geodemographics” extreme. Same as 2 but assuming 3 major voting centers per
departamento. Probabilities are essentially zero in all 18 departamentos.
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Fig. 4. Probability of the Hernandez conjecture by departamento, in the “all-
geodemographics” extreme. Same as 2 but assuming 5 major voting centers per
departamento. Probabilities are essentially zero in all 18 departamentos.
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Fig. 5. Population size by departamento.
3. The “partial-geodemographics” intermediate.
Having explored the two extreme cases outlined above,
we next move to middle ground in which outcomes are
partially due to geodemographics and partially to an
overall geodemography-independent preference, or GIP.
More specifically, GIP refers to the component of a voter’s
preference that is independent of where that voter lives.
Under the Hernandez conjecture, the GIP is constrained
by two opposing requirements: on one hand, it should be
large enough to favor the candidate in question (in this
case Hernandez), while on the other hand it cannot be
too large or the observed ballot turnaround cannot be
explained. We show that, under linear dependencies and
our conservative assumption outlined in prong 2 above,
the numerical value of GIP – to which we will assign the
variable ‘ – is constrained by the Hernandez conjecture
to reside within a critical interval ‘ œ (‘l, ‘u). We show
that, under the conservative assumptions outlined above
(assumptions that favor the Hernandez conjecture),
‘ œ (‘l, ‘u) when:
E[(X ≠ 12xM )(X ≠ xM )]
E(X ≠ xM ) ≠ E(X ≠
1
2xM )
<
c
m
1
vH ≠ vN
vH + vN
2
< 0 ,
[6]
where c and m are parameters of h(x) (constant and gra-
dient, respectively). We note that the left-hand side of
the inequality is guaranteed to be negative by Jensen’s
inequality. Parameters c and m cannot be assumed to be
independent, and the distribution of their ratio is thus
computed by repeated fitting of h(x) to bootstrapped
data. The probability of the Hernandez conjecture is
then computed simply as the fraction of bootstrapped
values of c/m that put the middle term in Eq. (6) within
the prescribed bounds. Figures 6, 7, and 8 show proba-
bilities that the geodemographics of Honduras together
with ballot data support the Hernandez conjecture; in
addition, we explored logarithmic and power-law spatial
dependencies in addition to linear; these probabilities
are only non-negligibly greater than zero in three of the
more sparsely-populated departamentos. When all of the
data are analyzed together, the country-wide probability
of the Hernandez conjecture is less that 0.0001 for all
configurations analyzed.
4 | www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.XXXXXXXXXX Gerrish et al.
00.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Fig. 6. Probability of the Hernandez conjecture by departamento. Colors indicate
the values of P{‘ˆ œ (‘l, ‘u)}, computed by Eq. (6), which is the probability of the
Hernandez conjecture. Here, we assumed one major voting center per departamento.
Probabilities are very close to zero (gray) in 15 departamentos but are non-negligible
in three departamentos, namely, Gracias a Dios, Islas de la Bahia, and Olancho.
A look at Fig 5 shows these three departamentos to be among the more sparsely
populated.
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Fig. 7. Probability of the Hernandez conjecture by departamento. Same as 6 but
here we assume 3 major voting centers per departamento. Probabilities are very close
to zero (gray) in 15 departamentos but are non-negligible in three departamentos,
namely, Gracias a Dios, Islas de la Bahia, and Olancho. A look at Fig 5 shows these
three departamentos to be among the more sparsely populated.
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Fig. 8. Probability of the Hernandez conjecture by departamento. Same as 6 but
here we assume 5 major voting centers per departamento. Probabilities are very close
to zero (gray) in 15 departamentos but are non-negligible in three departamentos,
namely, Gracias a Dios, Islas de la Bahia, and Olancho. A look at Fig 5 shows these
three departamentos to be among the more sparsely populated.
Conclusions
We have rigorously assessed the Hernandez conjecture and
found no configuration of ballot data, geodemographic data,
or both, that supports it. Our analyses have been both: 1) as
agnostic as possible eliminating dependence on assumptions
and ballot data where possible, and 2) as generous as possi-
ble to the conjecture, intentionally giving it the upper hand
wherever assumptions were required. And still, our calcula-
tions indicate the probability of the conjecture’s veracity to
be essentially zero under a wide range of di erent conditions.
We comment that, were the present study conducted within
the rigorous world of scientific research, the weight of the evi-
dence presented here should be su cient to robustly support
rejection of the conjecture.
Our findings corroborate previous statistical analyses in
their assessment of the elections [39, 41, 46]. And given the
absence of a plausible alternative to the Hernandez conjecture,
it follows that our analysis leaves little room for any remaining
confidence in the fairness of this election.
Discussion: the broader context
Our conclusions, while concerning, could be seen as a micro-
cosm of a global trend – one that shows increasing suscepti-
bility to populism and its unfortunate ripple e ects, namely,
increasingly callous foreign policies as well as autocratic and
dictatorial governance. Indeed, the 2017 Honduran elections
and the reshaping of the Honduran Constitution is a window
into this trend. And Honduras is not alone: for example, Hon-
duras is almost an exact replication of the scenario in Cote
d’Ivoire (Ivory Coast) in 2010, where the incumbent Laurent
Gbagbo refused to relinquish power to Allasane Ouattara who
clearly won the popular vote [49].
Historical evidence overwhelmingly supports the notion
that citizens and governing systems are truly functional only
within a context of fairness [50, 51]. Implicit in such fairness
is unfettered democracy, a respect for citizens’ rights and
participation. The universalizability principle put forth by
Benn [52] suggests there is something to be gained from the
extrapolation of political microcosms such as the one studied
here to the global community.
Finally, the response of the US was a familiar one [53, 54].
Soon after the first and tentative announcement of Hernandez’s
victory, and despite clear indications of fraud, the incumbent
administration was cleared to receive its share of $644 million
in continued US aid – military and other [55–60]. This award,
poignantly, is strongly conditional on a positive assessment of
human rights and progress combating corruption and inequal-
ity [19, 61–65]. The analysis we have presented here discredits
the Hernandez conjecture, which was very probably the incum-
bent’s only remaining plausible defense against accusations of
fraud.
Acknowledgements
Special thanks to John Gerrish for helpful discussions and
suggestions. Many thanks to Ing. Luis Redondo for sending
and referring us to essential data sets. This work was supported
in part by a CNRS visiting scholar grant (to PG), and Hope
College scholarships (to IG).
1. The Economist (2017) Eight years after a coup, a heated election in Honduras - A double
helping of Hernández?
2. Ruhl JM (2010) Honduras unravels. Journal of Democracy 21(2):93–107.
3. Tharoor I (2017) The crisis in Honduras should matter to the U.S.
4. (2017) El TSE declara a Juan Orlando Hernandez ganador de las elecciones 2017.
5. Runde D (2017) Foreign Policy: The United States Has a Lot Riding on the Honduras
Election.
6. Hernandez DM (2014) Unaccompanied child migrants in" crisis": new surge or case of
arrested development? Harvard Journal of Hispanic Policy (27):11–17.
Gerrish et al. PNAS | April 19, 2018 | vol. XXX | no. XX | 5
7. Meyer PJ, Seelke CR, Taft-Morales M, Margesson R (2014) Unaccompanied children from
central america: Foreign policy considerations. Current Politics and Economics of South and
Central America 7(3):463.
8. Stinchcomb D, Hershberg E (2014) Unaccompanied migrant children from central america:
context, causes, and responses. SSRN Electronic Journal.
9. Arslan C et al. (2015) A new profile of migrants in the aftermath of the recent economic
crisis. OECD Social, Employment and Migration Working Papers.
10. Carlsen L (2014) Blowback on the border: Decades of short-sighted, inhumane us policy
have brought a child refugee crisis to america’s door. Indigenous Policy Journal 25(3).
11. Ticktin M (2016) Thinking beyond humanitarian borders. Social Research: An International
Quarterly 83(2):255–271.
12. Garcia M (2016) Alliance for prosperity plan in the northern triangle: not likely a final solution
for the central american migration crisis. Council on Hemispheric Affairs.
13. Paley D (2018) Capitalism and Crisis in Central America, eds. Latham KE, O’Daniel AJ.
(Springer International Publishing, Cham), pp. 25–37.
14. Wade CJ (2015) Central america: neoliberalism, democracy, and transnationalism. Latin
American Research Review 50(2):267–274.
15. Villeda SP, Miklos A (2018) Central americans under trump: uncertainty on both sides of the
border. Journal of The Latin American Studies Association.
16. Tanzi V (1998) Corruption around the world: causes, consequences, scope, and cures. Staff
Papers 45(4):559–594.
17. Wilkinson T (2013) In post-coup Honduras, rising poverty and inequality, report says.
18. Cooper L, Hodge J (2017) Coup’s legacy of violence, corruption in Honduras endures.
National Catholic Reporter.
19. Ruhl JM (2011) Political corruption in central america: Assessment and explanation. Latin
American Politics and Society 53(01):33–58.
20. Treisman D (2000) The causes of corruption: a cross-national study. Journal of Public
Economics 76(3):399 – 457.
21. Green L (2011) The nobodies: neoliberalism, violence, and migration. Medical Anthropology
30(4):366–385.
22. Cruz JM (2015) The root causes of the central american crisis. Current history 114(769):43.
23. McMullan M (1961) A theory of corruption. The Sociological Review 9(2):181–201.
24. (2017) Salvador Nasralla irá a la cabeza de la Alianza.
25. Malkin E (2017) Political Unrest Grips Honduras After Disputed Election. New York Times.
26. Gies H (2017) Hondurans anxiously await election results. Al Jazeera.
27. (2017) Honduras: Nasralla arriba en primera proyeccion del TSE.
28. BBC (2017) Honduras election: Violent clashes ahead of final result. BBC News.
29. (2017) INFOBAE: Elecciones en Honduras: la autoridad electoral postergó la declaración
del ganador en la carrera presidencial.
30. BBC (2017) Honduras election: Opposition candidate Nasralla rejects poll count. BBC
News.
31. (2017) Honduras: Toque de queda de 6:00 pm a 6:00 am por 10 d\’{i}as. La Prensa.
32. (2017) Seguidores de la Alianza de Oposicion en Honduras hacen sonar cacerolas en
protesta por toque de queda.
33. Diaz L, Palencia G (2017) Rebel Honduran police ignore curfew order, election protesters
rejoice. Reuters.
34. Forde K, Finnegan C (year?) Democracy ’lost’: Honduran rights groups fear violence as US
recognizes president. ABC News.
35. Press A (2018) Man shot dead at protest over Honduras’ disputed election.
36. Parodi C, Fink N, Lopresto J, Salome Canteros L (2017) Honduras: Mesa Nacional de
Derechos Humanos denuncia asesinatos y detenciones tras protestas por fraude electoral.
El Ciudadano.
37. Malkin E (2017) Honduran President Declared Winner, but O.A.S. Calls for New Election.
38. Garrido E (2017) Las protestas se intensifican en Honduras tras la reelección del presidente
en un supuesto "fraude". El Mundo.
39. Nooruddin I (2017) Analysis for the organization of american states (oas).
40. (2017) Is honduras’s ruling party planning to rig an election? The Economist.
41. (2017) What the data say about the integrity of honduras’s election. The Economist.
42. Altaweel M (2013) GeoLounge: How Geography Influences Affect Voting Behavior.
43. Feinberg M, Tullett AM, Mensch Z, Hart W, Gottlieb S (2017) The political reference point:
How geography shapes political identity. PloS one 12(2):e0171497.
44. Johnston R, Pattie C (2006) Putting Voters in their Place. (Oxford Scholarship Online,
Oxford).
45. Emont J (2017) Why Geography Is Undermining Democracy Around the World. The Atlantic.
46. Redondo L (2017) Honduras: Election 2017 – fraud analysis – how it was done
(www.ganasusa.com), Technical report.
47. EFE (2017) Honduras: posible fraude, muertos y mucha tensión. ABC Color.
48. Wolfram Research Inc. (2018) Mathematica, Version 11.3, Technical report.
49. Okosun TY (2018) Presidential conflict in Cote d’Ivoire: governance, political power, and
social justice. (Lexington Books, Lanham MD).
50. Rawls J (1999) A Theory of Justice. (Belknap Press).
51. Galtung J (year?) Violence, peace, and peace research. Journal of Peace Research
6(3):167–191.
52. Pojman LP, Westmoreland R, eds. (1996) Egalitarianism and Equal Consideration of
Interests in Equality.
53. Kinzer S (2007) Overthrow: America’s century of regime change from Hawaii to Iraq.
54. Miller PD (2016) American power & liberal order: a conservative internationalist grand
strategy. (Georgetown University Press).
55. Clarke K (2018) A crisis of legitimacy continues in Honduras. America the Jesuit Review.
56. Zengerle P (year?) Exclusive: U.S. document certifies Honduras as supporting rights amid
vote crisis. Reuters.
57. Kinosia S (2017) US recognizes re-election of Honduras president despite fraud allegations.
The Guardian.
58. Malkin E (2017) U.S. Backs Honduran President’s Victory in Disputed Election. New York
Times.
59. Board E (2018) Opinion | Hondurass president suspiciously reversed a loss. Then the U.S.
congratulated him. The Washington Post.
60. Bitar SE (2016) US military bases, quasi-bases, and domestic politics in Latin America.
(Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire : Palgrave Macmillan).
61. Doshi S, Ranganathan M (2018) Towards a critical geography of corruption and power in
late capitalism. Progress in Human Geography p. 030913251775307.
62. Schoultz L (1981) U.s. foreign policy and human rights violations in latin america: A
comparative analysis of foreign aid distributions. Comparative Politics 13(2):149–170.
63. Prevost G, Vanden HE, Campos CO, Ayerbe LF (year?) US national security concerns in
Latin America and the Caribbean: the concept of ungoverned spaces and failed states.
64. Chayes S (2017) When corruption is the operating system: the case of honduras.
65. Koonings K, Kruijt D (2004) Armed actors: organised violence and state failure in Latin
America. (Zed Books, London).
6 | www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.XXXXXXXXXX Gerrish et al.
Supplementary Information for
A quantitative analysis of the 2017 Honduran election and the argument used to defend its
outcome
Philip J Gerrish1,2, Benjamin Zepeda3,4, T Y Okosun5, Irene A Gerrish6 & Rosemary Joyce7
Philip J Gerrish
E-mail: pgerrish@gatech.edu
This PDF file includes:
Supplementary text
Figs. S1 to S16
References for SI reference citations
Philip J Gerrish1,2, Benjamin Zepeda3,4, T Y Okosun5, Irene A Gerrish6 & Rosemary Joyce7 1 of 23
Supporting Information Text
Model overview.
Definitions:
• We will employ the term “half-time” to denote the time at which the vote counts were halted due to an alleged system
failure. This point in fact occurred a little more than half way through the elections: the alleged system failure occurred
when 57% of the votes were counted.
• We use the word “geodemographics” in a narrow sense referring only to the geographic distribution of the population
(i.e., how population density is distributed over the geographic map of Honduras).
• We define vH and vN to be the total numbers of votes for Hernandez and Nasralla, respectively, that had been counted
by half time, and we define their sum: v = vH + vN .
• We define VH and VN to be total numbers of votes for Hernandez and Nasralla after all votes are counted at the end of
the election, respectively, and we define their sum: V = VH + VN .
• We define independent variable x to be the distance between a voter and the nearest voting center.
• We let u(x)dx denote the number of voters whose distance from the nearest voting center lies within the interval
(x, x+ dx).
• As defined previously, the Hernandez conjecture refers to the argument employed by the incumbent to explain how he
won the election fairly despite a significant lead by the opposition at half time. This scenario rests on two fundamental
premises:
1. The demographics premise, referring to the incumbent’s claim that, as the distance to the nearest voting center
increases, people are increasingly likely to vote for the incumbent. This premise is implemented in our model by
function fH(x).
2. The vote-count dynamics premise, referring to the incumbent’s claim that, as the distance to the nearest voting
center increases, the probability that a person’s vote would have been counted by half time decreases. This premise
is implemented in our model by function g(x).
Taken together, the foregoing two premises could, in principle, give rise to the spectacular ballot turnaround observed in
the 2017 elections that culminated in a win by Hernandez. Generically, this Hernandez conjecture is reflected by the
simultaneous fulfillment of the conditions vN > vH and VH > VN .
• We define Ê(x) = ku(x)dx, where k =
!s xM
0 u(x)dx
"≠1 and xM is the maximum distance from an individual to the
nearest voting center, i.e., Ê(x) is the probability density of population as a function of distance from nearest voting
center, x.
• We define:
fH(x) = P{vote H | x}
fN (x) = P{vote N | x} ,
i.e., the probabilities that a person will vote for Hernandez and Nasralla, respectively, given that the distance between
the person and the nearest voting center is x.
• We define:
g(x) = P{vote counted at half time | x} ,
i.e., the probability that a person’s vote is counted by half time, given that the person’s distance from the nearest voting
center is x.
• Given the foregoing definitions, the fraction of votes going to Hernandez and Nasralla at half time is, respectively,
vH = E[fH(X)g(X)]
and
vN = E[fN (X)g(X)]
where X ≥ Ê(x).
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• Likewise, the fraction of votes going to Hernandez and Nasralla when all votes are counted is:
VH = E[fH(X)]
and
VN = E[fN (X)]
where X ≥ Ê(x).
• Modeling the e ects of geodemographics. We define function h(x) with the properties,⁄ xM
0
h(x)dx = 0 and
⁄ xM
0
hÕ(x)dx > 0
This function h(x) we will call the geodemography component. The second of the two foregoing conditions guarantees that
h(x) increases more than it decreases such that there is a net upward displacement in h(x) as x increases (h(xM )≠ h(0)
> 0) – consistent with the Hernandez conjecture.
– Case 1: The “all-geodemographics” extreme:
fH(x) = c+ h(x)
fN (x) = c≠ h(x) ,
for some constant c which delineates an axis of reflection. We call this the “all demographics” extreme, because
there is no e ect of overall voter preference: outcomes result exclusively from demographic and vote-count dynamics
e ects. This fact derives from the observation that, given the above definitions we have:⁄ xM
0
fH(x)dx =
⁄ xM
0
fN (x)dx
– Case 2: The “partial-geodemographics intermediate”. This case allows for outcomes that are partly due to
demographics and vote-count dynamics, and partly due to voter preference that is independent of where a voter
lives. We define an index of overall geodemography-independent preference, ‘, as follows:
fH(x) = c+ ‘+ h(x)
fN (x) = c≠ ‘≠ h(x)
When overall voter preference favors Nasralla, ‘ is negative.
Assumption: The single assumption made by all of our analyses is that people’s tendency to vote for a given party was
not a ect by the system shut-down that occurred at half-time.
Objectives: Our approach is to start at two extremes, both of which require a reduced set of assumptions and data, and
work our way toward middle ground.
1. Assess the likelihood of the Hernandez conjecture under the assumption of a “well-mixed” population (the “no-
geodemographics” extreme). No geodemographic data are required for this analysis.
2. Assess whether the geodemography of Honduras could alone support the Hernandez conjecture (the “all-demographics”
extreme). No ballot data are required for this analysis.
3. Compute the probability of the Hernandez conjecture given both the geodemography of Honduras and the vote
counts at half-time. Both ballot data and geodemographic data are used in this analysis.
Objective 1: Fair win probability in the “no geodemographics” extreme.. In this first analysis, we will ignore the demographic
argument put forth by Hernandez loyalists, with the purpose of gaining insight into the magnitude of the probabilities under a
completely agnostic model.
Let pˆ and qˆ denote estimators of the probabilities that an individual votes for Hernandez and Nasralla, respectively. These
are Binomial sampling estimators with associated normal distributions:
pˆ ≥ N (p,‡2p) and qˆ ≥ N (q,‡2q) ,
where ‡2p = p(1≠ p)/N , ‡2q = q(1≠ q)/N , p = nH/N , q = nN/N , N = total number of votes cast, nH = number of votes cast
for Hernandez, and nN = number of votes cast for Nasralla. The probability of a win by Hernandez is thus:
EX [(1≠  X(p,‡2p))] where X ≥ NX(q,‡2q) ,
and   denotes the cumulative normal distribution. Simply taking the numbers given just before the purported “system failure”,
and assuming: 1) no e ects of changing demographics, and 2) no tendency for people to have a change of heart due to the
“system failure” and vote for Hernandez, we find that the probability of an ultimate win by Hernandez to be roughly 10≠1770.
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Objective 2: Fair win possibility in the “all geodemographics” extreme..Our subsequent analyses give as much credence as
possible to the Hernandez “victory scenario”, in order to determine the likelihood of a win by Hernandez when he is favored by
a “best-case-scenario”.
• Nasralla’s lead at half time may be written mathematically as vN > vH , or:
E[fN (X)g(X)] > E[fH(X)g(X)]
which may be rewritten as:
E[(c≠ h(X))g(X)] > E[(c+ h(X))g(X)]
which reduces to the condition:
E[g(X)h(X)] < 0 [1]
• Hernandez’s overall lead may be written mathematically as VH > VN , or:
E[fH(X)] > E[fN (X)]
which may be written as:
E[c+ h(X)] > E[c≠ h(X)]
which reduces to the condition:
E[h(X)] > 0 [2]
Here, we would like to look qualitatively for scenarios in which vote counts at half time could put Nasralla ahead:
E[g(X)h(X)] < 0
while hiding the fact the Hernandez was in fact winning:
E[h(X)] > 0
Linear model.Here, we assume that the functions g(x), fH(x), and fN (x) are linear. For simplicity, we will assume fH(x) and
fN (x) are mirror images of one another.These linear functions are thus given by:
fH(x) = a+mx
fN (x) = b≠mx
where a and b are lower and upper bounds, and m = (b≠ a)/xM . We further assume that g(x) is a linearly decreasing function
of distance, given by:
g(x) = c≠ dx .
Condition for fair win by Hernandez. Our first observations are that, all else being equal, Hernandez wins legitimately (VH > VN )
when: ⁄ xM
0
fH(x)u(x)dx >
⁄ xM
0
fN (x)u(x)dx
or: ⁄ xM
0
(a+mx)u(x)dx >
⁄ xM
0
(b≠mx)u(x)dx
Rearranging gives:
2m
⁄ xM
0
xu(x)dx >
⁄ xM
0
(b≠ a)u(x)dx
or:
2
1
b≠ a
xM
2⁄ xM
0
xu(x)dx > (b≠ a)
⁄ xM
0
u(x)dx
Noting that
s xM
0 u(x)dx = N and
s xM
0 xu(x)dx = NE(X), where E(X) is the mean distance between individuals and the
nearest voting center. Rearranging, we have that under a linear model, the condition for a fair win by Hernandez (Eq. (2))
reduces to:
E(X ≠ 12xM ) > 0 [3]
where X ≥ Ê(x), and recalling that Ê(x) = u(x)/N . This very simple and intuitive result provides an easy test to see whether
Honduran geodemography alone could give rise to a win by Hernandez. The only assumption made is that voters that live
further from voting centers are more likely to vote for Hernandez; no model parameters are required. We apply Eq. (2) to
Honduran geodemographic data to compute the probability that geodemography by itself supports a fair win by the incumbent.
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Condition for half-time lead by Nasralla. Nasralla leads at half time (vH > vN ) when:⁄ xM
0
fN (x)g(x)u(x)dx >
⁄ xM
0
fH(x)g(x)u(x)dx
or: ⁄ xM
0
(b≠mx)(c≠ dx)u(x)dx >
⁄ xM
0
(a+mx)(c≠ dx)u(x)dx
Again, we have that m = (b≠ a)/xM . We now make a conservative assumption favoring the Hernandez conjecture: we assume
that a vote cast at the farthest point from the voting center will have been shipped in and counted by half time with probability
zero. This assumption gives us d = c/xM . Rearranging gives:
E[(X ≠ 12xM )(X ≠ xM )] > 0 [4]
The “all-geodemographics” condition under which the opposition’s half time lead could obfuscate an underlying lead by the incumbent.
This condition is met when conditions Eqs Eq. (3) and Eq. (4) are met simultaneously. Applying these conditions, Honduran
geodemographic data alone (no ballot data necessary) support the victory scenario with probability e ectively equal to zero.
We reiterate, however, that this is for the extreme in which there is no geodemography-independent preference (GIP) one way
or the other, i.e., geodemography in this case is assumed to be the only factor influencing the outcome.
Objective 3: Inferring GIP signal based on half-time vote counts..
General model.
• The claim we would like to evaluate is that:
VH > VN
despite the fact that:
vH = 0.41 and vN = 0.46
• Conditions for a win by Hernandez are given when VH > VN , as defined above.
– Case 1: Under “all demographics” assumption, this condition is met when:⁄ xM
0
(c+ h(x))u(x)dx >
⁄ xM
0
(c≠ h(x))u(x)dx
which reduces to the condition: ⁄ xM
0
h(x)u(x)dx > 0
We note that total population size is N =
s xM
0 u(x)dx, and we define a new function Ê(x) = u(x)/N which has the
property
s xM
0 Ê(x)dx = 1. We can now rewrite the above condition as:⁄ xM
0
h(x)Ê(x)dx > 0,
or equivalently, Hernandez wins under the “all demographics” assumption when:
E[h(X)] > 0 , where X ≥ Ê(x) [5]
– Case 2: When there is an overall voter preference, we have:⁄ xM
0
(c+ ‘+ h(x))u(x)dx >
⁄ xM
0
(c≠ ‘≠ h(x))u(x)dx ,
which, when the above definitions are applied reduces to the general condition for a win by Hernandez:
E[h(X)] > ≠‘ , where X ≥ Ê(x) [6]
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Fig. S1. Schematic of voting probabilities and population size as a function of distance from the nearest major voting center. Solid red curves plot probabilities of voting for
Hernandez, fH(x) (three different plausible curves); these probabilities increase with distance from major voting centers to reflect the victory-scenario argument of Hernandez
loyalists. Dashed red curves plot probabilities of voting for Nasralla, fN (x) (three different plausible curves); these probabilities decrease with distance from major voting
centers, again to reflect the victory-scenario argument. The blue curve represents a plausible plot of population size as a function of distance from the nearest major voting
center, u(x). The green line plots plausible probabilities that a vote cast at distance x from the voting center would have been bussed in to the voting center and counted half
way through the election (when the purported system failure occurred); this function we will denote as g(x).
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Vote counts at “half time”.The vote counts at “half time” when the alleged system failure occurred are given by:
vH =
⁄ xM
0
fH(x)g(x)u(x)dx =
⁄ xM
0
(c+ ‘+ h(x))g(x)u(x)dx
vN =
⁄ xM
0
fN (x)g(x)u(x)dx =
⁄ xM
0
(c≠ ‘≠ h(x))g(x)u(x)dx
At half time, Nasralla was winning by known factor r > 1, supplying us with the following information:
r
⁄ xM
0
(c+ ‘+ h(x))g(x)u(x)dx =
⁄ xM
0
(c≠ ‘≠ h(x))g(x)u(x)dx
or, rearranging:
E[h(X)g(X)] = [1≠ r1 + r c≠ ‘]E[g(X)]
which gives:
‘ = 1≠ r1 + r c≠
E[h(X)g(X)]
E[g(X)] [7]
or, rewriting, vote counts vH and vN at half-time reflect an overall geodemographics-independent preference (GIP) for Hernandez
of:
‘ = c
1
vH ≠ vN
vH + vN
2
≠ E[h(X)g(X)]E[g(X)] [8]
When this quantity is negative, there is overall GIP for Nasralla. To compute an overall fair win by Hernandez given half-time
ballot data, therefore, condition Eq. (6) must hold, where ‘ is defined by Eq. (9), giving the condition:
E[h(X)] > E[h(X)g(X)]E[g(X)] ≠ c
1
vH ≠ vN
vH + vN
2
[9]
or generally:
c
1
vH ≠ vN
vH + vN
2
E[g(X)] > E[h(X)g(X)]≠ E[h(X)]E[g(X)] [10]
Inserting linear functions for g(X) and h(X), and again employing the conservative assumption g(xM ) = 0, gives the
condition:
E[(X ≠ 12xM )(X ≠ xM )]
E(X ≠ xM ) ≠ E(X ≠
1
2xM ) <
c
m
1
vH ≠ vN
vH + vN
2
< 0 , [11]
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Fig. S2. Demographics of Honduras. Red circles plot the larger cities and towns of Honduras. Circle size is an indicator of population size.
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Fig. S3. Three-pronged approach. A, Our first approach was to ignore geodemography, i.e., to assume that one’s tendency to vote one way or the other was
completely independent of where one lives. This straightforward calculation revealed that the probability of a fair win by Hernandez is zero, suggesting that a fair win would
require some artifactual explanation. An entirely plausible such explanation was put forth by the Hernandez camp and this we refer to as the Hernandez conjecture. B,
Our second approach was to assume that geodemography was the only factor affecting the outcome, i.e., to assume that one’s tendency to vote one way or the other was
entirely dependent on where one lives, so that if one took an average over space there would be no net preference for one candidate over the other. The geodemographics
effect in this case has two components: the component of how the population is distributed over the country of Honduras (geodemographics effects), and the vote-count
dynamics that resulted in votes closer to voting centers being more likely to have been counted by half-time. These calculations again revealed that the probability of a fair win
by Hernandez is zero when the country is analyzed as a whole but when each departamento is analyzed separately a non-negligible probability was computed for two
sparsely-populated departamentos. C, Our third approach was to assume there were essentially three components to one’s votes: vote-count dynamics, geodemographics,
and geodemographics-independent preference (GIP). We statistically removed the first two of these components in order to estimate GIP. For the Hernandez conjecture to
be true, it must be the case that the GIP lies within goldilocks zone; we found this to have small but non-negligible probabilities in 3 sparesly-populated departamentos and
zero in the remaining 15; when the country was analyzed as a whole, the probability of the conjecture was zero under several different circumstances.
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Fig. S4. Distribution of population density of Honduras as a whole, Ê(x) (vertical axes), as a function of distance to nearest major voting center, x
(horizontal axes). The four panels assume that there are different numbers of major voting centers in the country. To give the incumbent’s “victory scenario” argument as much
strength as possible, we assumed major voting centers were few and far between. The incumbent’s argument relies on effects of distance between voters and voting centers;
as such, by looking at cases where these distances are potentially large increases the power of the argument – it is part of the best-case-scenario for the incumbent.
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Fig. S5. The “all-demographics” case: one-parameter exponential model. We ask the question: assuming we know nothing about voter preferences,
can the demographics of Honduras support a “victory scenario” such as the one surmised by the incumbent? From the “no-demographics” case, we know that an ultimate win
by the incumbent would require that the Alianza’s half-time lead was only an apparent lead – an artifact of demographics and vote-count dynamics – and that, were all votes
counted with equal probability at half time, the incumbent would have been in the lead. Mathematically, such a scenario occurs when E[g(X)h(X)] < 0 and E[h(X)] > 0.
Blue and orange curves plot E[h(X)] and E[g(X)h(X)], respectively, whereX ≥ Ê(x), against log10 r (horizontal axis), where r is the exponential parameter in the
model. The purported victory scenario is thus supported when the orange curve is positive and the blue curve is negative. As evidenced by the plotted curves, we found no
case in which this is true.
12 of 23 Philip J Gerrish1,2, Benjamin Zepeda3,4, T Y Okosun5, Irene A Gerrish6 & Rosemary Joyce7
-1.0 -0.5 0.5 1.0
-150-100
-50
50
100
150 NVC = 2
-1.0 -0.5 0.5 1.0
-100
-50
50
100 NVC = 5
-1.0 -0.5 0.5 1.0
-150-100
-50
50
100
150 NVC = 10
-1.0 -0.5 0.5 1.0
-150
-100
-50
50
100
150
NVC = 50
Fig. S6. The “all-demographics” case: linear model. We ask the question: assuming we know nothing about voter preferences, can the demographics of
Honduras support a “victory scenario” such as the one surmised by the incumbent? From the “no-demographics” case, we know that an ultimate win by the incumbent would
require that the Alianza’s half-time lead was only an apparent lead – an artifact of demographics and vote-count dynamics – and that, were all votes counted with equal
probability at half time, the incumbent would have been in the lead. Mathematically, such a scenario occurs when E[g(X)h(X)] < 0 and E[h(X)] > 0. Blue and orange
curves plot E[h(X)] and E[g(X)h(X)], respectively, whereX ≥ Ê(x), against linear slope parameterm (horizontal axis). The purported victory scenario is thus supported
when the orange curve is positive and the blue curve is negative. As evidenced by the plotted curves, we found no case in which this is true.
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Fig. S7. The “all-demographics” case: two-parameter exponential model. We ask the question: assuming we know nothing about voter preferences,
can the demographics of Honduras support a “victory scenario” such as the one surmised by the incumbent? From the “no-demographics” case, we know that an ultimate win
by the incumbent would require that the Alianza’s half-time lead was only an apparent lead – an artifact of demographics and vote-count dynamics – and that, were all votes
counted with equal probability at half time, the incumbent would have been in the lead. Mathematically, such a scenario occurs when E[g(X)h(X)] < 0 and E[h(X)] > 0.
Blue and orange surfaces plot E[h(X)] and E[g(X)h(X)], respectively, whereX ≥ Ê(x), against log10 rh (first horizontal axis) and log10 rg (second horizontal axis),
where rh and rg are the exponential parameters in the model. The purported victory scenario is thus supported when the orange surface is positive and the blue surface is
negative. As evidenced by the plotted surfaces, we found no case in which this is true.
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Fig. S8. Distribution of population density of Honduras by departamento, Ê(x) (vertical axes), as a function of distance to nearest major voting center,
x (horizontal axes). A different color is used for each departamento. NVC is the number of major voting centers assumed for each departamento in the country (NVC=1
and NVC=3). To give the incumbent’s “victory scenario” argument as much strength as possible, we assumed major voting centers were few and far between. The incumbent’s
argument relies on effects of distance between voters and voting centers; as such, by looking at cases where these distances are potentially large increases the power of the
argument.
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Fig. S9. A small sample-size look at probabilities of: a) an overall win by Hernandez (top), and b) the Hernandez conjecture (bottom).
Plotted are histograms of the relevant quantities based on jackknifed samples ofX from the complete set of geodemographic data of Honduras. The probabilities of interest are
indicated by red bars: a) in the top panel, the red bars show the case for which E(X) > 0 indicating an overall win by Hernandez; b) in the bottom panel, the red bars show the
overlap between E[h(X)]2 and≠E[h(X)g(X)], indicating cases for which a ballot turnaround – such as the one observed in the 2017 – is possible. Jackknife sample sizes
here are extremely small (N = 20) compared to the population of the country (≥ 8◊ 106), but already the probabilities of a) and b) are small. The number of jackknifed
samples is 10, 000 (misleadingly labeled here as “#BS”). p-values indicate the fraction of the total counts represented by the red bars. To give the Hernandez conjecture as
much credibility as possible, we assumed major voting centers were few and far between (here NVC=1 voting center per departamento). The incumbent’s argument relies on
effects of distance between voters and voting centers; as such, by looking at cases where these distances are potentially large increases the power of the argument – it is part
of the best-case-scenario for the incumbent.
16 of 23 Philip J Gerrish1,2, Benjamin Zepeda3,4, T Y Okosun5, Irene A Gerrish6 & Rosemary Joyce7
-140 -120 -100 -80 -60 -40 -20 00
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
[h(X)]
NVC = 1
p = 0.0109
N = 50
#BS = 10000
-10 000 -5000 0 5000 100000
10 000
20 000
30 000
40 000
[h(X)]2, -[h(X)g(X)]
NVC = 1
p = 0.0109
N = 50
#BS = 10000
Fig. S10. A small sample-size look at probabilities of: a) an overall win by Hernandez (top), and b) the Hernandez conjecture
(bottom). Plotted are histograms of the relevant quantities based on jackknifed samples ofX from the complete set of geodemographic data of Honduras. The probabilities
of interest are indicated by red bars: a) in the top panel, the red bars show the case for which E(X) > 0 indicating an overall win by Hernandez; b) in the bottom panel, the red
bars show the overlap between E[h(X)]2 and≠E[h(X)g(X)], indicating cases for which a ballot turnaround – such as the one observed in the 2017 – is possible. Jackknife
sample sizes here are extremely small (N = 50) compared to the population of the country (≥ 8◊ 106), but already the probabilities of a) and b) are small. The number of
jackknifed samples is 10, 000 (misleadingly labeled here as “#BS”). p-values indicate the fraction of the total counts represented by the red bars. To give theHernandez
conjecture as much credibility as possible, we assumed major voting centers were few and far between (here NVC=1 voting center per departamento). The incumbent’s
argument relies on effects of distance between voters and voting centers; as such, by looking at cases where these distances are potentially large increases the power of the
argument – it is part of the best-case-scenario for the incumbent.
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Fig. S11. A small sample-size look at probabilities of: a) an overall win by Hernandez (top), and b) the Hernandez conjecture
(bottom). Plotted are histograms of the relevant quantities based on jackknifed samples ofX from the complete set of geodemographic data of Honduras. The probabilities
of interest are indicated by red bars: a) in the top panel, the red bars show the case for which E(X) > 0 indicating an overall win by Hernandez; b) in the bottom panel, the
red bars show the overlap between E[h(X)]2 and ≠E[h(X)g(X)], indicating cases for which a ballot turnaround – such as the one observed in the 2017 – is possible.
Jackknife sample sizes here are extremely small (N = 100) compared to the population of the country (≥ 8◊ 106), but already the probabilities of a) and b) are very small.
The number of jackknifed samples is 10, 000 (misleadingly labeled here as “#BS”). p-values indicate the fraction of the total counts represented by the red bars. To give the
Hernandez conjecture as much credibility as possible, we assumed major voting centers were few and far between (here NVC=1 voting center per departamento). The
incumbent’s argument relies on effects of distance between voters and voting centers; as such, by looking at cases where these distances are potentially large increases the
power of the argument – it is part of the best-case-scenario for the incumbent.
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Fig. S12. A small sample-size look at probabilities of: a) an overall win by Hernandez (top), and b) the Hernandez conjecture
(bottom). Plotted are histograms of the relevant quantities based on jackknifed samples ofX from the complete set of geodemographic data of Honduras. The probabilities
of interest are indicated by red bars: a) in the top panel, the red bars show the case for which E(X) > 0 indicating an overall win by Hernandez; b) in the bottom panel, the red
bars show the overlap between E[h(X)]2 and≠E[h(X)g(X)], indicating cases for which a ballot turnaround – such as the one observed in the 2017 – is possible. Jackknife
sample sizes here are extremely small (N = 20) compared to the population of the country (≥ 8◊ 106), but already the probabilities of a) and b) are very small. The number
of jackknifed samples is 10, 000 (misleadingly labeled here as “#BS”). p-values indicate the fraction of the total counts represented by the red bars. To give the Hernandez
conjecture as much credibility as possible, we assumed major voting centers were few and far between (here NVC=3 voting centers per departamento). The incumbent’s
argument relies on effects of distance between voters and voting centers; as such, by looking at cases where these distances are potentially large increases the power of the
argument – it is part of the best-case-scenario for the incumbent.
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Fig. S13. A small sample-size look at probabilities of: a) an overall win by Hernandez (top), and b) the Hernandez conjecture
(bottom). Plotted are histograms of the relevant quantities based on jackknifed samples ofX from the complete set of geodemographic data of Honduras. The probabilities
of interest are indicated by red bars: a) in the top panel, the red bars show the case for which E(X) > 0 indicating an overall win by Hernandez; b) in the bottom panel, the red
bars show the overlap between E[h(X)]2 and≠E[h(X)g(X)], indicating cases for which a ballot turnaround – such as the one observed in the 2017 – is possible. Jackknife
sample sizes here are extremely small (N = 50) compared to the population of the country (≥ 8◊ 106), but already the probabilities of a) and b) are very small. The number
of jackknifed samples is 10, 000 (misleadingly labeled here as “#BS”). p-values indicate the fraction of the total counts represented by the red bars. To give the Hernandez
conjecture as much credibility as possible, we assumed major voting centers were few and far between (here NVC=3 voting centers per departamento). The incumbent’s
argument relies on effects of distance between voters and voting centers; as such, by looking at cases where these distances are potentially large increases the power of the
argument – it is part of the best-case-scenario for the incumbent.
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Fig. S14. Fraction voting for the incumbent (PN) as a function of distance from nearest voting center. Under the assumption of different
numbers of voting centers (NVC). We note that the observed trend runs counter to the trend surmised by the incumbent to explain his victory. Voter data courtesy of The
Economist (1). Demographic data of Honduras drawn from Wolfram databases (2).
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Fig. S15. Fraction voting for the incumbent (PN) as a function of distance from nearest voting center. Under the assumption of different
numbers of voting centers (NVC). We note that the observed trend runs counter to the trend surmised by the incumbent to explain his victory. Voter data courtesy of The
Economist (1). Demographic data of Honduras drawn from Wolfram databases (2).
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Fig. S16. Fraction voting for the incumbent (PN) as a function of distance from nearest voting center. Under the assumption of different
numbers of voting centers (NVC). We note that the observed trend runs counter to the trend surmised by the incumbent to explain his victory. Voter data courtesy of The
Economist (1). Demographic data of Honduras drawn from Wolfram databases (2).
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